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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 





HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 We first heard this case following dismissal for failure to state a claim. See 
Matthews v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 613 F. App’x 163, 166 (3d Cir. 2015) (hereinafter 
Matthews I). At issue in this appeal are Chaka Matthews’s claims under Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RA) 
against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC). See id. at 164–65. The 
District Court granted summary judgment to the DOC and Matthews now appeals. For 
the reasons that follow, we will dismiss Matthews’s claims as to the declaratory relief 
sought and affirm as to compensatory damages.  
I 
 We recited the facts in some detail in Matthews I, 613 F. App’x at 165–66, so we 
need not recount them here. After we remanded the case, the parties conducted discovery 
and cross-moved for summary judgment. The Magistrate Judge assigned to the case 
recommended the District Court deny Matthews’s motion and grant the DOC’s motion. 
Matthews then had fourteen days to file written objections to the proposed disposition of 
the case, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), but requested a two-week extension. The judge 
granted a one-week extension, but Matthews failed to timely object. So the District Court 
adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation in its entirety.  
 Matthews moved for reconsideration and for relief from the judgment. The 
Magistrate Judge recommended the Court consider the merits of Matthews’s objections 




Judge’s recommendations and denied Matthews’s motions on the merits. Matthews 
timely appealed.  
II1 
 Matthews requests declaratory relief and compensatory damages under the ADA 
and RA. As to declaratory relief, we agree with both the DOC and the District Court that 
Matthews lacks standing to pursue declaratory relief because he was released from prison 
before filing this lawsuit. And because the undisputed facts cannot support finding the 
DOC acted with “deliberate indifference” towards Matthews, we will affirm the summary 
judgment as to compensatory damages. See Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 181 (3d 
Cir. 2018). 
A 
 To meet the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,” a plaintiff “must 
have suffered or be imminently threatened with a concrete and particularized ‘injury in 
fact’ that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and likely to be 
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] 
plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.” Friends of 
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) (citing 
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 n.6 (1996) (“[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross.”)).  
 
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and we have 





 Matthews first seeks a declaratory judgment that the DOC violated his rights under 
the ADA and RA. The Declaratory Judgment Act, which governs requests for relief like 
this one, is available only where “a case of actual controversy” exists between the parties. 
28 U.S.C. § 2201(a); see also MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 
(2007) (holding “the phrase ‘case of actual controversy’ in the Act refers to the types of 
‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that are justiciable under Article III”) (citation omitted). But 
because Matthews was released from prison prior to filing suit—and nothing in the 
record suggests he will be reincarcerated—there is no live case or controversy with 
respect to the declaratory relief sought. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 
95, 104–05 (1983) (concluding no “actual controversy . . . for a declaratory judgment to 
be entered” existed where the defendant was subjected by police and “assert[ed] that he 
may again be subject” to an illegal chokehold). 
 Matthews implicitly concedes as much by failing to address at any point in his 
briefing either the District Court’s reasoning or the DOC’s argument that he lacks 
standing. So we will dismiss his claims as to the declaratory relief sought.  
B 
 We turn next to compensatory damages. See, e.g., Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. 
Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 77 (2013). We agree with the District Court that the undisputed 
facts cannot support claims for compensatory damages under Title II of the ADA or 





We exercise plenary review over the summary judgment and “we apply the same 
standard as the district court to determine whether summary judgment was appropriate.” 
Physicians Healthsource, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 954 F.3d 615, 618 (3d Cir. 2020). 
Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We view 
“the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in 
that party’s favor.” Physicians Healthsource, Inc., 954 F.3d at 618 (quotation marks and 
citation omitted). We consider the ADA and RA claims “together because the substantive 
standards for determining liability are the same.” Furgess v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 
285, 288 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
2 
 To successfully assert a claim under Title II of the ADA, Matthews must 
demonstrate 
(1) he is a qualified individual; (2) with a disability; (3) he was excluded 
from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any such 
entity; (4) by reason of his disability. 
 
Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 553 n.32 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation 
omitted). Because he seeks compensatory damages, Matthews faces an additional hurdle: 
he must also prove “intentional discrimination.” Haberle, 885 F.3d at 181 (citing S.H. ex 




 “To prove intentional discrimination, an ADA claimant must prove at least 
deliberate indifference,” which requires both “(1) knowledge that a federally protected 
right is substantially likely to be violated . . . and (2) failure to act despite that 
knowledge.” Id. (citing and quoting S.H. ex rel. Durrell, 729 F.3d at 265). Matthews 
could show such a right was “substantially likely to be violated” by either (1) alleging “a 
failure to adequately respond to a pattern of past occurrences of injuries like [his]”; or (2) 
alleging facts that “prove that the risk of . . . cognizable harm was so great and so obvious 
that the risk and the failure . . . to respond will alone support finding deliberate 
indifference.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
 Matthews claims “deliberate indifference” by the DOC in “fail[ing] to act for 
several months despite the knowledge that [he] required accommodations for his mobility 
impairment.” Reply Br. 7–8. He cites his multiple visits to the medical department 
“requesting relief from his pain and assistance with his mobility;” his discussions of 
housing needs with corrections officers; and his filing of a disability accommodation 
request. Matthews Br. 40. And he also claims the “risks of violations of the ADA for 
people with temporary mobility impairments in the [DOC] is undoubtedly exactly the 
type of risk that is so great and so obvious that the complete inaction of the DOC on this 
issue amounts to deliberate indifference.” Reply Br. 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
We are not persuaded. 
 In previously analyzing Matthews’s claims under the Eighth Amendment, we 
concluded he could not meet a similar “deliberate indifference” standard. Matthews I, 613 




with deliberate indifference is . . . to recklessly disregard a substantial risk of serious 
harm.”). We reasoned the medical professionals involved in Matthews’s diagnosis and 
treatment “were attentive to [his] impairment” and “[i]f they exposed [him] to greater risk 
of injury by refusing to recommend a cell reassignment, their mistake was negligence, 
not deliberate indifference.” Matthews I, 613 F. App’x at 170. As to the DOC, we “noted 
that non-medical prison officials are generally justified in relying on the expertise and 
care of prison medical providers.” Id.; see id. (“[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual 
knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a 
prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with . . . deliberate 
indifference.” (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004))). 
 So we previously held that neither the medical professionals involved, nor the 
prison officials, nor the DOC acted with deliberate indifference towards Matthews. 
Matthews I, 613 F. App’x at 170. Because the “[t]he definition of deliberate indifference 
in the RA and the ADA context is consistent with our standard of deliberate indifference 
in the context of § 1983 suits by prison inmates,” we reach the same conclusion here. 
S.H. ex rel. Durrell, 729 F.3d at 263 n.23. Nothing in this “well-developed record” 
fundamentally changes our analysis, as Matthews has not adduced new evidence 
indicating the DOC acted with deliberate indifference. App. 4. 
* * * 
 We will dismiss Matthews’s request for declaratory relief and affirm the District 
Court’s summary judgment for the reasons stated. 
